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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

COREY L. BROOKS,

:

Appellant/Petitioner.

Case No. 920853-CA
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Petitioner Brooks files this petition for rehearing.
Utah R. App. P. 35; see also Cumminqs v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129
P. 619, 624 (1912) ("petitions for rehearings [are proper if] . . .
we have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or decision which
may affect the result, or that we have based the decision on some
wrong principle of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the result . . . " ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For purposes of this petition, Corey Brooks agrees with
this Court's summary of the "case" as set forth in its opinion. See
State v. Brooks, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (Utah App. 1993) (a copy
of the opinion is attached in Addendum A).

Mr. Brooks reiterates,

however, that at trial he was represented by Nick H. Porterfield.1

1. Mr. Porterfield was counsel for Mr. Brooks at a second
trial. The first trial resulted in a mistrial because of a hung
jury. (R 32-37).

(R 76); Opening brief of Mr. Brooks, page 3.

Following the jury's

verdict, Mr. Porterfield withdrew as counsel.

(R 76); Appellee's

brief, pages 3, 12. The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association then
was appointed to represent Mr. Brooks on appeal.

The differences in

counsel are significant because the arguments on appeal,
particularly the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, relate
directly to the actions or inactions below.

In parts of this

Court's opinion, however, issues were treated as not being preserved
when appellate counsel specifically noted prior counsel's
ineffectiveness as a basis for review.
Following the issuance of the October 29, 1993, opinion,
Mr. Brooks received a fifteen day enlargement of time for filing
this Petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issue presented in this petition for rehearing focuses
on whether this Court overlooked or improperly resolved the
sentencing issue.

A statement of facts beyond what has already been

presented in the briefs is unnecessary for this petition.

See

Opening brief of Mr. Brooks, pages 23-26; Appellee's brief,
pages 33-35; Reply brief of Mr. Brooks, pages 14-15 (copies of these
pages are attached in Addendum B).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In its opinion this Court acknowledged that had Mr. Brooks
argued "plain error" on appeal, such an analysis would "[allow] us
to address [his illegal punishment claim] for the first time on

- 2

appeal."

Brooks, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. at 19. Mr. Brooks did in fact

argue plain error, as well as "ineffective assistance of counsel"
and the applicability of a governing rule.

See Opening brief of

Mr. Brooks, pages 23-26; Reply brief of Mr. Brooks, pages 14-15. He
respectfully requests that this Court address whether the underlying
sentence should be vacated as his argument was apparently overlooked
in the opinion.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT OVERLOOKED APPELLATE COUNSEL'S
PRESENTATION OF THE "PLAIN ERROR" DOCTRINE AND HIS
ARGUMENTS RELATING TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
In its opinion, this Court appropriately acknowledged
Mr. Brooks argument on whether the "convictions for robbery and
burglary illegally punish[ed] him twice for the same crime, since
#

one could not have committed the robbery without necessarily

committing the burglary.'"
15, 19 (Utah App. 1993).

See State v. Brooks, 225 Utah Adv. Rep.

While the opinion correctly stated that

prior trial counsel had failed "to raise this issue before the trial
court[,]" id., the opinion then incorrectly stated that Mr. Brooks'
appellate counsel did "not argue that the trial court committed
plain error in sentencing him for burglary, thus allowing us to
address it for the first time on appeal, . . . "

Id. (emphasis

added).
Overlooked by the opinion were direct arguments to the
contrary.

As Mr. Brooks' appellate counsel explicitly stated, the

trial court committed plain error at sentencing:

- 3 -

this Court should utilize the plain error doctrine to
address the merits of Mr. Brooks' illegal sentence.
The error in convicting and sentencing Mr. Brooks for
one crime should have been plain to the the trial
court. Allowing Mr. Brooks to suffer a superfluous
first degree felony conviction and sentence is
prejudicial.
Opening brief of Mr. Brooks, page 26 (copies of the pertinent pages
are attached in Addendum B).
The State also acknowledged that appellate counsel's "plain
error" argument was based on prior defense counsel's failure to
present the sentencing issue, although it disagreed with the legal
merits of the issue.

See Appellee's brief, page 34 (according to

the State, "[t]his Court need consider neither plain error nor
counsel ineffectiveness as bases for overcoming defendant's
trial-level waiver of this argument").

In short, in response to

Mr. Brooks' appellate arguments, the State substantively addressed
the illegal sentencing argument and it did not contend that
appellate counsel was barred procedurally from presenting the
issue.

The issue should have been considered.
Having held already that the plain error doctrine would

"thus [allow] us to address it for the first time on appeal, . . . "
225 Utah Adv. Rep. at 19, in accordance with this Court's own
acknowledgment the opinion should fully analyze whether the sentence
was improper.

See also Opening brief of Mr. Brooks, pages 23-26 (in

addition to the "plain error" doctrine, appellate counsel also based
review on the "ineffective assistance of counsel" principle and Utah
R. App. P. 22(e)).

- 4
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In addition, this Court incorrectly concluded that it could
not correct an illegal sentence on appeal.

See Brooks, 225 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 19; but see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Babbel,
770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989) ("Babbel I"). In Babbel I, however, the
Utah Supreme Court reviewed a State sentencing argument on appeal
even though the State raised its claim for the first time during
oral argument.

See id at 993 (emphasis added) ("the State, at oral

argument, raised an issue with respect to the lawfulness of the
sentence imposed").

"[The State] explained that this issue was not

briefed because [it] thought it might be resolved by the county
attorney before the appeal would be argued."

Id. at 994.

Importantly, the issue there did not have to be first resubmitted at
the trial court level, although such a step had been contemplated
and was then available to the State.

Id; accord State v. Babbel,

813 P.2d 86, 87-88 (Utah 1991) ("Babbel II").
The Babbel I Court fully considered and analyzed the
sentencing issue, notwithstanding the State's presentation of the
issue for the first time on appeal.

Babbel I, 770 P.2d at 993-94.

In its order remanding the matter for resentencing, the appellate
opinion pointed out "the unquestioned fact of error."

Id. at 994.

The trial court was clearly instructed on the issue.
"The error in sentencing occurred because both the defense
attorney and the prosecutor [improperly advised] the judge [on the
applicable sentence]."

Babbel II, 813 P.2d at 86. The resulting

trial court error, a sentence unfavorable to the State, was then
appropriately analyzed for the first time on appeal.

- 5 -

Just as the State's appellate attorney there was permitted
to correct the county attorney's performance, Mr. Brooks' appellate
attorney similarly requests a directive here to correct his trial
counsel's deficient performance.

Due to prior trial counsel's

ineffectiveness, Mr. Brooks was limited in his ability to raise the
issue until the appeal.

At the earliest possible stage of his

appeal, though, appellate counsel2 properly presented his arguments.
See Opening brief of Mr. Brooks, pages 23-26.

Unlike other cases

where claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not raised,
in the case at bar Mr. Brooks' appellate counsel properly presented
the involved issue3 for this Court's review.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Brooks respectfully requests a rehearing by this Court
on whether "his sentence underlying the burglary conviction is
illegal and should be vacated."

See Brooks, 225 Utah Adv. Rep.

at 19. Appellate counsel's presentation of the plain error doctrine
"thus allow[ed] [the Court] to address it for the first time on
appeal[.]"

Id.

2. Prior to this petition for rehearing, Mr. Brooks'
appellate counsel was Elizabeth Holbrook.
3. For the reasons discussed previously in his opening
brief and in his reply brief, Mr. Brooks continues to maintain the
other briefed issues. Nonetheless, the issues briefed there were
not "overlooked" in the same manner as the argument presented in
this petition and hence are not contained herein.
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Cory L. BROOKS,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 920853-CA
FILED: 10/29/93
Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
ATTORNEYS:
Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
Jan Graham and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Russon, and Garff.1
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
BENCH, Judge:
Cory L. Brooks appeals his conviction for
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1990),
and aggravated burglary, a first degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1990).
Defendant alleges that the trial court erred by
not removing for cause certain jurors, that his
trial counsel was ineffective, and that he is being
illegally punished twice for the same crime. We
affirm.
FACTS
Defendant responded to a newspaper
advertisement placed by Stephanie Vert, offering
for sale a distinctive diamond ring. Defendant
examined the ring in the Vert's home, spending
thirty to forty-five minutes with Stephanie and
her mother, Martha Vert. Defendant indicated
that he wished to purchase the ring and that he
would return to their home the next morning for
that purpose.
Stephanie was the only one home the next
morning when defendant arrived. Stephanie
invited defendant in and offered him some
coffee. Defendant picked up the diamond ring
and then pointed a pistol at Stephanie and
ordered her to crawl into a bathroom. Defendant
then produced handcuffs and ordered Stephanie
to handcuff herself to plumbing beneath the
sink. When Stephanie did not handcuff herself to
defendant's satisfaction, he produced a set of
keys and ordered her to recuff herself. He then
threatened her by saying, "You better not
remember what I look l i k e /

15

Defendant spent ten to twelve minutes
rummaging through the Vert's home. Using a
walkie-talkie, he spoke to an apparent
accomplice, arranging to be picked up outside
the Vert's home. After defendant left, Stephanie
freed herself by unscrewing the plumbing and
then called for help. The Verts claimed that
defendant stole several thousand dollars worth of
jewelry, including the diamond ring, from their
home.
Shortly after the robbery, defendant visited
with friends and offered to sell them some
jewelry, including a diamond ring. During this
visit, defendant and his friends saw a television
account of the Vert robbery. Defendant boasted
that he was the one who had committed the
robbery. Before defendant left, he gave his
friends a chain taken from the Vert home. The
friends subsequently called the police and turned
the chain over to them. Martha Vert later
identified the chain as one of the items stolen
from her home.
Stephanie gave an accurate description of
defendant the day of the robbery, and later
positively identified defendant from a photo
array. Several months after the crime, she also
positively identified defendant from a lineup.
Martha Vert had difficulty identifying defendant
from the photo array, but she independently
identified him from the lineup as the person who
had come to her home and examined the ring the
night before the robbery.
Defendant was charged with aggravated
robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person.
Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial due to
a hung jury.
Prior to the second trial, the trial court
conducted voir dire of prospective jurors. Initial
voir dire by the trial court involved ascertaining
whether prospective jurors had any acquaintance
with the parties, court personnel, attorneys, or
witnesses. The trial court then explained the
charges, and determined that none of the
prospective jurors had heard of the case against
defendant.
The court then engaged in the following
exchange:
THE COURT: Are there any of you who
have any pressing or urgent business or
personal matters over the next four days that
would prevent you from providing
satisfactory jury service over the next four
days?
MR. BARBER: My name is Frank L.
Barber.
THE COURT: Frank what?
MR. BARBER: Barber, B-a-r-b-e-r.
THE COURT: What is your problem?
MR. BARBER: Since I qualified for the
jury list my wife has had knee surgery and
I'm required to take her for therapy three
times a week, Monday, Wednesdays and
Fridays at 5:00 o'clock in Sandy.
THE COURT: Could other arrangements be
made?

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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MR. BARBER: I have been unable to so
far.
THE COURT: You are working on it?
MR. BARBER: Weil, she has until - a
week from today she goes in to the doctor
to see if the therapy has been successful.
THE COURT: I understand. But the
question was: Is there any other possibility
to work out other arrangements?
MR. BARBER: I don't have anyone I could
trust her with.
THE COURT: You haven't called the
therapist to see if that could be moved back
20 or 30 minutes?
MR. BARBER: No I haven't.
THE COURT: Ordinarily, we are in recess.
So, if you are selected, the Court would
appreciate having you see if that — the time
could be changed; and we'd recess in time
enough to allow you to do that. Given that
accommodation, do you feel that you could
serve?
MR. BARBER: I am not sure that I could
devote my undivided attention to the case
under the circumstances.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Barber did not indicate that he would, in
any way, be biased against either the defense or
the prosection.
The trial court also asked the prospective
jurors whether they had ever been subjected to
any assaults or threats, and whether any had
been victim of a burglary. Several prospective
jurors responded affirmatively. The trial court
engaged in the following conversation with the
prospective jurors who had responded
affirmatively:
JUROR GEURTS: On two different
occasions we've had somebody walk in our
unlocked back door and take my purse.
THE COURT: Okay.

BrOOkS
Iv. Rep. 15

Code«Co
Provo. Utah

defense witness in a case prosecuted by the
prosecutor in the instant case. The prosecutor
also believed that he and Mrs. Geurts had
attended the same church in the past. When
questioned by defense counsel, Mrs. Geurts
indicated that these factors would not affect her
impartiality in hearing the case. Neither counsel
moved to strike for cause prospective jurors
Geurts, Heap, Pike, or Barber. Defense counsel
used a peremptory challenge to remove Geurts.
Heap, Pike, and Barber served on defendant's
jury.
The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated
robbery and aggravated burglary. Defendant was
given concurrent sentences for each offense and
ordered to pay fines and restitution. Because
defendant used a pistol to commit the offenses,
and because he was on parole when he
committed them, the trial court found defendant
guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon by
a restricted person and his sentences were
enhanced under the firearm enhancement statute.
The sentences were
imposed to run
consecutively to another uncompleted sentence at
the Utah State Prison.
ISSUES
Defendant argues, for the first time on appeal,
that the trial court committed plain error by not
removing for cause prospective jurors Geurts,
Heap, Pike, and Barber. In the alternative,
defendant argues that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective because he failed to
request an adequate voir dire of the prospective
jurors. Defendant also argues, for the first time
on appeal, that his convictions for robbery and
burglary illegally punish him twice for the same
crime.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
At trial, defense counsel passed the jury for
cause, without in any way objecting to
JUROR HEAP: I've had - Daniel Heap.
prospective jurors Geurts, Heap, Pike, or
I've had my house broken into before, and
Barber. Where, on appeal, defendant challenges
our vehicles twice in the last couple of
the trial court's failure to remove prospective
years.
jurors and, at trial defense counsel did not move
THE COURT: Thank You.
to strike the prospective jurors for cause, we
JUROR PIKE: Larry Pike. As a child our
utilize a "plain error'' standard of review. State
home was burglarized when we were there.
v. Ellifiitz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App.
THE COURT: Anyone else?
1992). 2 The requirements for determining
The court then addressed a series of four whether plain error has occurred were
questions to ascertain whether the prospective articulated in State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29
jurors could try the case fairly and impartially. (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.
The court asked whether the prospective jurors Ct. 62 (1989), as follows:
would be willing to have their own guilt or
The first requirement for a finding of plain
innocence determined by people in the same
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., from
frame of mind as the prospective jurors. The
our examination of the record, we must be
court also asked the prospective jurors whether,
able to say that it should have been obvious
in their present state of mind, there was
to a trial court that it was committing error.
anything that would prevent them from acting
. . . The second and somewhat interrelated
fairly and impartially on the evidence presented
requirement for a finding of plain error is
without prejudicing the substantial rights of
that the error affect the substantial rights of
either party. None of the prospective jurors
the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful.
offered a response that would indicate bias.
Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
Mrs. Geurts was questioned further in
Therefore, even if we can conclude that the
chambers because her husband had been a trial court made an obvious error, we will not
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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reverse unless defendant demonstrates that,
absent the error, there is a sufficient likelihood
of a different result. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d at 174.
"There is a sufficient likelihood of a different
result when the appellate court's confidence in
the verdict is undermined." Id. (citing Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2068 (1984)).
As an alternative means of challenging the
jury selection procedures for the first time on
appeal, defendant claims that his trial counsel
was constitutionally ineffective. When a
defendant raises the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel, we "indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action 'might be considered sound
trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104
S. Ct. at 2065 (quotingMichel v. Louisiana, 350
U.S. 9 1 , 101, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164 (1955)). "In
order to bring a successful ineffective assistance
of counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment, a defendant must show [1] that
trial counsel's performance was deficient in that
it 'fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,' and [2] that the deficient
performance prejudiced the outcome of the
trial." State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah
App.), cert, denied,
P.2d
(Utah 1993)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct.
at 2064) (footnote omitted). 3
|
When a defendant raises both the issues of i
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel
on direct appeal, a common standard is
applicable.
I
The common standard exists because plain
error requires a showing that absent the
error, there is a substantial likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for defendant, and
similarly, the ineffective assistance standard
requires a showing that but for the
ineffective assistance of counsel, the result
would likely have been different for
defendant. Failure to meet the plain error
requirement of prejudice means that
defendant likewise fails to meet the required
showing under the ineffective assistance of
counsel standard.
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 174 (citation omitted).

Juror Bias
"An accused has a right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
448 (Utah 1988) (footnote omitted); accord U.S.
Const, amends. V, VI; Utah Const, art. I, §§7,
10 & 12; and Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14). Voir
dire serves two functions: "the detection of
actual bias [sufficient to challenge for cause],
and the collection of data to permit informed
exercise of the peremptory challenge." State v.
Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983)
(citations omitted). The scope of the voir dire
inquiry is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court because only the trial court knows when it
is satisfied that a prospective juror is impartial.
Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App.), cert,
denied, 113 P.2d 45 (Utah 1988); accord State
v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989);
State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Utah
1983); State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990).
A question of potential bias arises when a
prospective juror has been the victim of a
similar crime. When such a question arises, the
trial court must probe to determine whether the
prospective juror is, in fact, impartial despite the
past experience. This is generally accomplished
by the trial court simply asking if the juror can
be impartial. See, e.g., Jonas, 793 P.2d at
905-06; Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 931-32. If, after
probing the prospective juror's state of mind,
the trial court is satisfied that the juror can view
and weigh the evidence impartially, the inquiry
is at an end.

In the present case, prospective jurors Geurts,
Heap, and Pike indicated that they had all been
victims of similar crimes. Thus a question of
bias was raised with respect to all three jurors.
The trial court was therefore required to probe
further to determine if the prospective jurors
would be, in fact, impartial despite having been
victims of similar crimes. The trial court asked
the following four questions:
If you or a member of your family were
involved in a case such as the one before
you, would you be willing to have your case
or theirs tried by eight people in the same
frame of mind as you are now in?
Possessing the state of mind that you
have, is there anything that would prevent
ANALYSIS
any of you from acting fairly and
Defendant argues that the trial court
impartially without prejudice to the
committed plain error by not removing for cause
substantial rights of either party in this case?
prospective jurors Geurts, Pike, Heap, and
Is there any reason known to any of you
Barber. Specifically, defendant argues that
why you could not try the case fairly and
Geurts, Heap, and Pike were biased against him,
impartially upon any evidence and without
and that Barber was incompetent to serve on the
any bias for or against either party to the
jury. Defendant also argues that since
action? . . . .
prospective juror Geurts should have been
From your answers, I understand that
removed for cause, it was reversible error to
each of you individually now declares to me
compel him to use one of his peremptory
that you can listen attentively to the
challenges to remove her.
evidence, can apply the law to the facts
which you may find to exist and can reach
a verdict which is fair and impartial as to
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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each party in this controversy. Are there
any of you who for any reason feel that you
cannot?
None of the prospective jurors offered a
response that would indicate any bias as a result
of having been victims similar crimes.
In State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991),
three prospective jurors indicated that they had
been victims of similar crimes. The trial court
asked the three prospective jurors collectively
the following question:
Those three of you who have responded,
recognizing that this is a different time and
place and circumstances, would that
experience, having been the victim of that
type of crime, affect your ability to be fair
and impartial in this case, that is, would you
be unable to set aside that experience and
hear the evidence in this case and rule on
the evidence based upon what you hear and
the credibility of the witnesses? If you
would not be able to do so, I want you to
raise your hand.
Id. None of the prospective jurors raised a hand
to indicate any bias from having been victims of
similar crimes. Defense counsel moved to strike
all three jurors for cause. The trial court initially
removed all three jurors but subsequently
reinstated one of the removed jurors. Defense
counsel then removed the reinstated juror with a
peremptory challenge. The court held that when
prospective jurors indicate that they have been
victims of a similar crime, an inference of bias
is raised. Once there is an inference of bias,
according to the court, "the inference is
generally not rebutted simply by a subsequent
general statement by the juror that he or she can
be fair and impartial." Id. at 445. The court
concluded that the one compound question asked
by the trial court and the unequivocal answers of
the prospective jurors were not sufficient to
rebut the inference of bias. Id. at 447-48. The
court therefore reversed defendant's conviction
and remanded the case for a new trial.
Woolley is distinguishable from the instant
case in at least three respects. First, defense
counsel in Woolley moved to strike all three
challenged jurors for cause. Where defense
counsel challenges a juror for cause, the
decision to remove the juror lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Gotscnall,
782 P.2d at 462; accord Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at
177. Thus, the Woolley court was required to
review the trial court's decision not to remove a
juror for cause for an abuse of discretion. By
contrast, in the present case, where defense
counsel did not object to jurors for cause, we
review the trial court's actions for plain error.
Elliftitz, 835 P.2d at 174. The threshold
requirements necessary to demonstrate the trial
court committed plain error are much higher
than those required to demonstrate the trial court
committed an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the
holding in Woolley is not applicable where
defense counsel made no objection for cause to
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the jurors in question, as in the present case.
Second, Woolley involved a rather unusiu
situation during voir dire where the trial coui
removed a prospective juror for cause am
without further questioning reinstated th
removed juror. Where the trial court initiall;
agreed to remove a prospective juror for cause
some additional questioning of that particula
juror may be required if the trial court i
considering reinstating the juror. Such ai
unusual situation is not, however, present in th<
instant case.
Finally, the Woolley court focused on the fac
that the trial court asked only one compound
question of the prospective jurors who indicate<
that they had been victims of similar crimes
This one question, according to the court, wai
not sufficient to rebut the inference of bias.41 i
the instant case, however, the court probed th<
question of bias with four different questions
The four questions asked by the trial court in th<
present case were sufficient to rebut an]
question of bias regarding prospective juror
Geurts, Heap, and Pike.
We conclude, under a plain error analysis
that the trial court's voir dire was adequate tc
rebut any question of bias that arose wher
prospective jurors Geurts, Heap, and Pik*
indicated they had been victims of similaj
crimes. 5 It follows, therefore, that in light of oui
holding that there was no error in the voir dire
conducted by the trial court, there could likewise
be no prejudice in the procedure that affectec
the substantial rights of defendant.

Juror Incompetence
Defendant further argues that the trial court
erred by not excusing prospective juror Barbei
for cause because he was incompetent to serve.
Defendant's argument is based on the fact that
Mr. Barber had a scheduling conflict regarding
his wife's need for physical therapy. This
scheduling conflict, according to defendant,
diverted Barber's full attention from the trial and
therefore rendered him incompetent.
Defendant misconstrues the meaning of the
term "incompetent" in this context. Utah Code
Ann. §78-46-8(2) (1992), in effect at the time of
defendant's trial,6 defined those individuals
incompetent to serve as follows:
(2) The following persons are not competent
to serve as jurors:
(a) a person who has been convicted of a
felony;
(b) a person serving on active duty in the
military service of the United States;
(c) a person who is not capable because of
a physical or mental disability of rendering
satisfactory jury service. Any person who
claims this disqualification may be required
to submit a physician's certificate verifying
the disability and the certifying physician is
subject to inquiry by the court at its
discretion; or
(d) a person who does not meet the
requirements of Section 78-46-7. 7
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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While prospective juror Barber may have had a
scheduling conflict, he was not, as a matter of
law, incompetent to serve on defendant's jury.
The trial court did not commit plain error,
therefore, by not removing Barber for cause due
to incompetence.
Defendant claims, however, that since Barber
may have been distracted, he was unable to
serve impartially. This argument is without
merit. Incompetence does not deal with bias or
prejudice. Bias and prejudice refer to a "state of
mind [that] exists on the part of the juror with
reference to the cause, or to either party, which
will prevent him from acting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging [the prospective juror]." Utah
R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14). Bias and prejudice,
therefore, refer to a state of mind that would
lead a juror to favor one party over another. A
challenge for cause will lie against a juror who
is incompetent or biased or both. However, they
are not overlapping characteristics as urged by
defendant.
Juror Barber did not indicate that he was, in
any way, biased or prejudiced against the
defendant or the prosecution. There was not
even a question of bias raised, which would
have required the trial court to probe further.
All Mr. Barber indicated was that he had a
scheduling conflict that might demand some of
his attention. If the question were answered
forthrightly, many prospective jurors would
probably admit that something in their personal
lives could cause them to divert some of their
attention from the trial. Such distractions,
however, do not rise to the level of a challenge
for cause.8
We conclude that the trial court did not
commit plain error in seating juror Barber. It
likewise follows, that since there was no error
committed in seating Mr. Barber, there could be
no prejudice in the procedure that affected the
substantial rights of defendant.9
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues, in the alternative, that his
counsel was ineffective in not challenging for
cause prospective jurors Geurts, Heap, Pike, and
Barber. Because we have concluded that
defendant was not in any way prejudiced by voir
dire, defendant could not have been prejudiced
by the conduct of his counsel. Ellifiitz, 835 P.2d
at 174 ("Failure to meet the plain error
requirement of prejudice means that defendant
likewise fails to meet the required showing
under the ineffective assistance of counsel
standard."). Defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim therefore fails.
j
Convictions for Robbery and Burglary
Defendant argues that his convictions for
robbery and burglary illegally punish him twice
for the same crime, since "one could not have
committed the robbery without necessarily
committing the burglary." Defendant argues,
therefore, that his sentence underlying the I
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burglary' conviction is illegal and should be
vacated. Defendant failed, however, to raise this
issue before the trial court. We are governed by
the general principle that matters not placed in
issue before the trial court may not be raised for
the first time on appeal. See State v.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App.
1991). Defendant does not argue that the trial
court committed plain error in sentencing him
for burglary, thus allowing us to address it for
the first time on appeal, but instead he argues
that under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
22(e) a court can correct an illegal sentence at
any time. Rule 22(e) provides that a court may
"correct an illegal sentence, or one imposed in
an illegal manner, at any time." This rule,
however, is directed to the trial courts and
defendant must first ask the trial court to correct
his sentence if he believes that it has been
imposed in an illegal manner. State v. Gallegos,
849 P.2d 586, 591-92 (Utah App. 1993); see
also State v. Lee Zim, 79 Utah 68, 74, 7 P.2d
825, 827 (1932) (trial court may always
reassume jurisdiction to correct an erroneous or
illegal sentence). We therefore may not address
defendant's argument on his convictions for the
first time on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not commit plain error by
not removing for cause jurors Geurts, Heap, and
Pike. The trial court also did not commit plain
error by not removing for cause juror Barber.
Because of our conclusion on the plain error
issues, defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim likewise fails. We may not
address defendant's argument that he is being
illegally punished twice for the same crime since
that issue was raised for the first time on appeal.
We therefore affirm defendant's conviction.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff, acting pursuant to
appointment under Utah Code Ann. §78-3-24(10)
(1992).
2. Where defense counsel moves to strike jurors for
cause, we review the trial court's ruling for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462
(Utah 1989); accord Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 177.
3. In Garrett, we also discussed additional
requirements that must be satisfied in order for us to
address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on
direct appeal.
In addition to the substantive requirements . .
. there is a threshold requirement that must be
met before we may consider an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.
Ordinarily, such a claim may only be raised
through a collateral attack in habeas corpus
proceedings because "the trial record is
insufficient to allow the claim to be determined"
on direct appeal. State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d
1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). Consequently, we may
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consider an ineffective assistance claim on direct
appeal only if the record is adequate to permit a
decision. A trial record is adequate only if "we
are not aware of any evidence or arguments
which might be made that is [sic] not now before
us." Id.
849 P.2d at 580 (footnote omitted). Finally, in order
to address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
on direct appeal, defendant must also be "represented
by new counsel on appeal because it is 'unreasonable
to expect [trial counsel] to raise the issue of his own
ineffectiveness at trial on direct appeal.'" Id. at 580
n.3 (quoting Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d 619, 621
(Utah 1989)).
4. However, in Hornsby we held that one general
question was sufficient to rebut any questions
involving juror bias. 758 P.2d at 933. In Hornsby,
plaintiffs counsel requested, since Hornsby was suing
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, that
the trial court inquire into the religious affiliations of
the prospective jurors. The trial court refused to
inquire into individual affiliations and instead asked
the following question:
Are there any of you who feel that you would
have trouble being an impartial juror because of
feelings you may have either pro or con with
regard to the L.D.S. Church that you think might
affect your ability to be a fair and impartial juror
in this case? If so, I'd like you to raise your
hand.
Id. at 931-32. None of the prospective jurors raised a
hand. We held that "the question asked by the trial
court was sufficient to detect any actual subjective bias
to warrant a challenge for cause under [Utah R. Civ.
P. 47(f)(6)]." A/, at 932.
5. Defendant argues that it was reversible error to
require him to use a peremptory challenge on
prospective juror Geurts since she should have been
removed for cause. See State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765,
768 (Utah 1980) (it is reversible error to compel
defense counsel to use peremptory challenges to
remove prospective jurors that should have been
removed for cause); but see Ross v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 81, 86 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2277 (1988) (focus is
not whether defendant was required to use peremptory
challenge to strike juror who should have been
removed for cause, but on whether jury that actually
sat was fair and impartial). However, in light of our
holding that prospective juror Geurts was not subject
to removal for cause, defendant's argument fails.
6. Section 78-46-8 was amended effective July 1,
1992. Utah Code Ann. §78-46-8 (Supp. 1993).
7. Utah Code Ann. §78-46-7 (1992), in effect at the
time of defendant's trial, provided as follows:
(1) A person is competent to serve as a juror if
the person is:
(a) a citizen of the United States;
(b) over the age of 18 years;
(c) a resident of the county; and
(d) able to read, speak, and understand the
English language.
(2) In municipalities which are not primary or
secondary locations for the circuit court, a person
is not competent to serve as a juror in cases
involving the violation of a municipal ordinance
unless the person, in addition to meeting the
requirements listed in Subsection (1), resides
within the municipality whose ordinance is
alleged to have been violated or, in the case of a
municipality with a population of fewer than
3,000 persons, resides within 15 miles of the
municipality.

Codc»Co
Provo. Utah

Section 78-46-7 was amended in 1992 and 1993. Utah
Code Ann. §78-46-7 (Supp. 1993).
8. The trial court has discretion to excuse jurors who
have severe scheduling conflicts. Utah Code Ann.
§78-46-15 (1992), in effect at the time of defendant's
trial, provided:
(1) The court, upon request of a prospective
juror or on its own initiative, shall determine on
the basis of information provided on the juror
qualification form or by interview with the
prospective juror, or by other competent
evidence, whether the prospective juror should be
excused from jury service. The clerk shall enter
this determination in the space provided on the
juror qualification form.
(2) A person may be excused from jury service
by the court, at its discretion, upon a showing of
undue hardship, extreme inconvenience,or public
necessity for any period the court deems
necessary.
Section 78-46-15 was amended effective July 1, 1992.
Utah Code Ann. §78-46-15 (Supp. 1993).
9. In view of this disposition we need not rule upon
the State's Contingent Motion to allow it to
supplement the record with an affidavit from juror
Barber.
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[I]t is never too late to do justice. . . . "
The court is constituted to enforce legal rights
and redress legal wrongs, and whenever it is made
to appear, as it is in this case, that a wrong
has been perpetrated, it never hesitates to
exercise the power which it has, unless to do so
would do a greater injury than to refuse to
exercise it.
State v. Morgan, 64 P. 356, 362 (Utah 1901)(citation omitted).

II.
MR. BROOKS' CONVICTION FOR
BURGLARY MUST BE STRICKEN.
Mr. Brooks was convicted of both aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary for the event which occurred at the Vert
residence on January 29, 1991 (R. 203-204).

The constitutional law

governing this issue is set forth in Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038
(Utah App. 1990), as follows:
[N]o person may be placed in jeopardy for the
same criminal offense more than once. U.S.
Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, §12. The
federal and state double jeopardy guarantees are
viewed as having the same content, affording
defendants three separate protections: no second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,
no second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction, and no multiple punishments for the
same offense.
Id. at 1039 (citations omitted).
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6(2)(a) provides, MNo person
shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense."

Utah Code

Ann. section 76-1-402 provides additional statutory protection from
multiple punishments for one crime, stating:
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a
single criminal action for all separate offenses
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arising out of a single criminal episode;2
however, when the same act of a defendant under a
single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under
different provisions of this code, the act shall
be punishable under only one such provision; an
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any
such provision bars a prosecution under any other
such provision.
The statutory term "act" is defined as "a voluntary bodily movement
and includes speech."

Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-601(1).

State v.

Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah App. 1989).
The relevant "act" for purposes of the statute and double
jeopardy was the armed robbery.3

The robbery occurred after

Stephanie allowed the young man into Vert residence and began making
coffee for them.

Under the Utah Code and the facts of this case,

there was no separate act underlying the burglary conviction, which

2. "[A]11 conduct which is closely related in time and is
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective" constitutes a "single criminal episode." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-401.
3. Robbery is defined as "the unlawful and intentional
taking of personal property in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by
means of force or fear." Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-301. Utah
Code Ann. section 76-6-302 defines aggravated robbery as follows:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if
in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree
felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act
shall be considered to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt
to commit, during the commission of, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission
of a robbery.
-24-

required the unlawful remaining in the Vert residence with a gun and
the intent to commit a robbery.4

"Remaining" is not a "voluntary

bodily movement;" it is necessarily encompassed in the robbery.

On

the facts of this case, one could not have committed the robbery
without necessarily committing the burglary.
conviction should be reversed.

The burglary

See Duran, Utah Code Ann.

§76-1-601(1), supra.
While the trial counsel did not raise this issue, this
Court should nonetheless address it on the merits.

Authority for

vacating the illegal sentence underlying the burglary conviction is
provided by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), which states,
"The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in
an illegal manner, at any time."

Issues concerning the dual

punishment for one crime are considered sentencing issues.
State v. McCovev, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990).

E.g.

The rule permits

4. "A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person." Utah
Code Ann. section 76-6-202.
Aggravated burglary is defined by Utah Code Ann. section
76-6-203 as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated
burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing
from a burglary the actor or another participant
in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who
is not a participant in the crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a
dangerous weapon against any person who is not a
participant in the crime;
(c) possesses or attempts to use any
explosive or dangerous weapon.
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justice to be done regardless of whether the illegal sentence is
addressed in the trial court.

E.g. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86

(Utah), cert, denied 112 S.Ct. 883 (1992).
Alternatively, this Court should utilize the plain error
doctrine to address the merits of Mr. Brooks' illegal sentence.

The

error in convicting and sentencing Mr. Brooks for two separate first
degree felonies for one crime should have been plain to the trial
court.

Allowing Mr. Brooks to suffer a superfluous first degree

felony conviction and sentence is prejudicial.

See State v.

Eldredge, supra, discussing the plain error doctrine.
Alternatively, trial counsel's failure to raise this issue
was objectively deficient and prejudicial.

Mr. Brooks should not be

punished for his attorney's failure to raise this sentencing issue,
and this Court may reach the merits of this issue and correct the
error under the auspices of the ineffective assistance of counsel
doctrine.

See Strickland, ABA Standards, supra.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Mr. Brooks' convictions and order
a new trial with a voir dire that is adequate to provide a fair and
impartial jury.

This Court should order that upon Mr. Brooks'

retrial, he may not be convicted of and sentenced for both robbery
and burglary.
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performance might be made.

By presuming harm in such cases, the

waiver rule—which clearly applies to jury selection, see Utah R.
Crim. P. 18(c)(2), would effectively be swallowed by its "counsel
ineffectiveness- exception.

Instead, the finality of trial court

judgments should be supported, by upholding the waiver rule
against jury selection challenges that are raised for the first
time on appeal.16
The burden to show actual harm from counsel blunders in
jury selection, then, properly rests with defendant, as does the
burden of proving that actual blunders were made.

Having failed

to carry either burden, defendant's allegation of trial counsel
ineffectiveness should be rejected.
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF BOTH
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND AGGRAVATED BURGLARY.
Defendant makes another argument, also unpreserved by
trial-level objection, that he could not be convicted of both
16

Sounder Utah cases finding reversible error in preserved
jury selection issues have been those in which the challenged
jurors acknowledged actual bias. See, e.g.; State v. Jones, 734
P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987) (two jurors admitted that they would be
affected by close ties to murder victim's family); State v.
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1984) (juror expressed bias for
prosecution and stated, "In essence, I would prefer not to be
here"); State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (two
jurors "expressed strong feelings of anger and frustration" as
victims of crimes similar to that being tried); Jenkins v.
Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 535-36 (Utah 1981) (juror admitted
tendency to believe defendant physician in malpractice suit);
State v. Bailev. 605 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah 1980) (two jurors agreed
that police testimony could be relied upon "to the utmost");
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Utah 1975) (juror in
wrongful death action expressed "strong feelings" about trying to
recover money for the death of another). Again here, no such
admittedly-biased jurors were allowed to sit.
33

aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary.

This argument,

essentially that the burglary was a lesser included offense
within the robbery, should be summarily rejected.
This Court need consider neither plain error nor
counsel ineffectiveness as bases for overcoming defendant's
trial-level waiver of this argument.

Had defendant objected to

either the dual charges or the dual convictions in the trial
court, the objection would have been correctly denied.

Under

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301(1) (1990), robbery includes the element
of "taking of personal property" through force or fear.

The act

of "taking" is not part of the offense of burglary.17
Burglary, however, defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6202 (1990), does include an element that is not part of the
robbery definition:

the act of "enter[ing] or remain[ing] in a

building" with criminal intent.

The Utah Supreme Court has

squarely rejected defendant's argument that "remaining" is not an
"act" for the purposes of the burglary statute.

See State v.

Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985, amended on rehearing
1988).

Accordingly, once defendant wore out his welcome in the

Vert home by threatening and handcuffing Stephanie Vert within
the home, he committed burglary-

17

See id.

Then, when he took

The "aggravating" element for aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary is quite similar, that is, the possession or
use of a "dangerous weapon" in the course of the offense. Utah
Code Ann. SS 76-6-203, 76-6-302 (1990). Therefore, the State
analyzes only the simple robbery and simple burglary statutes for
the purpose of this argument.
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property from the home, an act accomplished with the aid of that
threat and assault, defendant committed robbery.
In short, the offenses of aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary, while overlapping, each contain an element
not found within the other*

This makes them separate criminal

offenses, for which defendant was properly tried and convicted,
even though they were committed during a "single criminal
episode," under Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402 (1990).

See State v.

Eichler, 584 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1978) (robbery and kidnapping
during same episode: both convictions affirmed); State v. Jones,
13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262 (1962) (burglary and theft (then
larceny) during same episode: both convictions affirmed); Duran
v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038 (Utah App. 1990) (same).

Defendant's

argument to the contrary, which ignores controlling legal
precedent, is therefore meritless.
CONCLUSION
Our adversary system of justice did not fail this
defendant.

He received a fair trial, and the convictions

resulting from that trial should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^

day of March, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHYv »
Assistant Attorney General
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deliberations.

When there are fundamental structural errors such

as this, prejudice should be presumed.
20-23.

See brief of appellant at

££. Vasouez v. Hillerv, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986)(Court

could not rely on defendant's conviction to apply harmless error
analysis to racial discrimination in the selection of the grand
jury, because Court could not determine whether the defendant
would have been indicted at all in the absence of the error in
the grand jury proceedings).

II.
THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE THE AGGRAVATED BURGLARY CONVICTION.
Mr. Brooks is arguing that the aggravated burglary
conviction should be stricken because it did not involve a
separate act from the acts essential to the aggravated robbery
conviction, as the term act is defined by Utah Code Ann. section
76-1-601(1) (a voluntary bodily movement).
23-27.

Brief of appellant at

In response, the State argues, "The Utah Supreme Court

has squarely rejected defendant's argument that 'remaining' is
not an 'act' for the purposes of the burglary statute.

See State

v. Bradley. 752 P.2d 974, 876 (Utah 1985, amended on rehearing
1988)."

Brief of appellee at 34. A copy of the Bradley decision

is in appendix 2 to this brief.

Nowhere in the Bradley decision

does the Utah Supreme Court address the question.
In order to convict one of aggravated burglary, the
State must prove that one entered or remained unlawfully in a
building with the intent to commit a felony with a firearm.
Code Ann. sections 76-6-202 and 203.
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It was the State's theory

in this case that Mr. Brooks remained unlawfully in the Vert
residence; there was no evidence that Mr. Brooks entered the Vert
residence unlawfully --he did so with the consent of Stephanie
Vert.

Because remaining is not a voluntary bodily movement, it

is not an act under the Utah Code justifying a separate
conviction bearing a five to life prison sentence.

Because on

the facts of this case, the jurors were not required to find that
Mr. Brooks committed any act for the aggravated burglary
conviction that was not already committed for the aggravated
robbery conviction, this Court should reverse the aggravated
robbery conviction.

See Bradley.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Mr. Brooks' convictions
and order a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

n

day of May, 1993

Attorney for tfr. Brooks
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